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Non-­‐Technical	  Summary	  
Good	   policy	   advice,	   in	   addition	   to	   requiring	   sound	   theoretical	   frameworks	   to	   identify	   growth-­‐
enhancing	  fiscal	  reforms,	  also	  needs	  a	  reliable	  evidence	  base.	  Much	  of	  this	  evidence	  base	  has	  tradi-­‐
tionally	  come	  from	  applications	  of	  econometric	  methods	  to	  various	  fiscal	  aggregates.	  However,	  con-­‐
cerns	  have	  recently	  been	  raised	  over	  the	  merits	  of	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  for	  policy	  reform	  advice	  in	  
practice;	  see,	  for	  example,	  Rodrik	  (2005),	  Hausmann	  et	  al.	  (2008a).	  It	  seems	  therefore	  useful	  to	  ques-­‐
tion	  whether	  business	  perception	  data	   included	   for	   instance	   in	   the	  World	  Bank	  Enterprise	   Surveys	  
(WBES)	  are	  a	  useful	  additional	  source	  of	  information	  to	  guide	  policy	  makers’	  choices.	  These	  surveys	  
contain	   ratings	   of	   various	   factors	   regarded	   as	   ‘obstacles’	   or	   ‘constraints’	   on	   firms'	   growth	   perfor-­‐
mance	   as	   identified	   by	   firm	   owners	   or	  managers.	  With	   firms'	   investment	   decisions	   likely	   to	   be	   an	  
important	  driver	  of	  aggregate	  economic	  growth,	  and	  these	  investment	  decisions	  likely	  to	  be	  affected	  
by	   firms'	   perceptions,	   such	   perception	   indicators	   could	   potentially	   be	   a	   valuable	   source	   of	   infor-­‐
mation	   on	   actual	   growth	   constraints.	   Indeed,	   a	   number	   of	   authors	   have	   recently	   argued	   over	   the	  
merits	  of	  such	  business	  survey	  information	  as	  a	  reliable	  identifier	  of	  actual	  constraints,	  and	  the	  policy	  
reforms	  that	  might	  follow.	  
The	  objective	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  examine	  whether,	  and	  when,	  subjective	  perceptions	  of	  firms	  may	  be	  
a	  useful	  source	  of	  information	  to	  help	  identify	  growth-­‐enhancing	  fiscal	  reforms.	  Specifically,	  adopting	  
the	  standard	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  and	  long-­‐run	  growth,	  we	  demon-­‐
strate	  that	  firms'	  perceptions	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  suffer	  from	  particular	  biases.	  We	  show	  that	  while	  
these	  biases	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  important	  for	  some	  fiscal	  policy	  reform	  options,	  they	  are	  not	  for	  
others.	  This	  suggests	  that	   it	   is	   important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  specific	  contexts	   in	  which	  such	  
business	  perception	  information	  is	  likely	  to	  offer	  reliable	  or	  unreliable	  guidance	  to	  growth-­‐enhancing	  
policy	  reforms.	  The	  essence	  of	  our	  argument	  is	  that,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  way	  business	  survey	  ques-­‐
tions	  are	  constructed,	  firms’	  responses	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  direct	  effects	  of	  policies	  alle-­‐
viating	  particular	  constraints	   that	   they	  see	  as	  obstacles,	  while	   ignoring	  the	  externalities,	  or	   indirect	  
effects	  of	  these	  policies.	  We	  exploit	  this	  assumption	  to	  model	  firm	  perceptions	  of	  fiscal	  policy-­‐related	  
constraints	   including	   taxation	   and	   public	   expenditures	   taking	   two	   different	   forms:	   flows	   of	   public	  
services	  and	  stocks	  of	  public	  capital.	  	  
The	  paper	  makes	  two	  contributions.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  evaluate,	  based	  on	  a	  class	  of	  endogenous	  growth	  
models,	  whether	   business	   perception	   data	   could	   be	   useful	   in	   identifying	   the	   optimal	   direction	   for	  
fiscal	  policy	  reform.	  We	  show	  that,	  regardless	  of	  model	  parameters,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  firms	  perceive	  the	  
(distortionary)	  tax	  rate	  as	  a	  more	  severe	  constraint	  than	  public	  service-­‐related	  constraints,	  which	  in	  
turn	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  more	  severe	  than	  public	  capital-­‐related	  constraints.	  Firms	  view	  fis-­‐
cal	   constraints	   in	   this	   order	   even	   when	   taxes	   and	   spending	   are	   set	   at	   their	   optimal,	   growth-­‐
maximizing	  values	  (i.e.	  where	  changes	  to	  any	  fiscal	  parameters	  would	  result	  in	  declines	  of	  the	  growth	  
rate).	  However,	  this	  framework	  also	  predicts	  that	  for	  comparisons	  of	  fiscal	  constraints	  involving	  simi-­‐
lar	   types	  of	  public	   spending	   (e.g.	  between	  two	  public	   service-­‐related,	  or	   two	  public	  capital-­‐related,	  
spending	   categories),	   business	   perception	   data	   do	   not	   suffer	   from	   such	   systematic	   biases	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
optimal	  policy	  responses.	  
The	  second	  contribution	  is	  to	  compare	  actual	  business	  perception	  data	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  Enter-­‐
prise	  Surveys,	  and	  in	  particular	  how	  firms	  rank	  fiscal	  policy-­‐related	  constraints,	  with	  the	  ranking	  pre-­‐
dicted	  by	  the	  endogenous	  fiscal-­‐growth	  framework.	  We	  find	  that	  the	  WBES	  rankings	  of	  fiscal	  policy-­‐
related	  constraints	  closely	  match	  those	  predicted	  by	  the	  theoretical	  models.	  
	  Das	  Wichtigste	  in	  Kürze	  
Politikempfehlungen	   zur	   Förderung	   von	   Wirtschaftswachstum	   basieren	   idealerweise	   auf	   theoreti-­‐
schen	  Modellen	  und	  auf	  empirischer	  Evidenz.	  Letztere	  ist	  traditionell	  das	  Ergebnis	  statistischer	  Aus-­‐
wertungen	   von	   aggregierten	   fiskalpolitischen	   Daten	  mittels	   Regressionen.	   In	   der	   Literatur	   werden	  
Politikempfehlungen,	   die	   auf	   dieser	   Art	   von	   empirischer	   Evidenz	   basieren,	   allerdings	   zunehmend	  
kritisiert,	  siehe	  z.B.	  Rodrik	  (2005)	  und	  Hausmann	  et	  al.	  (2008a).	  Daher	  ist	  es	  wichtig	  zu	  evaluieren,	  ob	  
Perzeptionen	  von	  Unternehmen,	  die	  beispielsweise	  im	  Rahmen	  von	  den	  Weltbank	  Enterprise	  Surveys	  
(WBES)	   erhoben	   werden,	   möglicherweise	   eine	   zusätzliche	   Informationsquelle	   für	   fiskalpolitische	  
Entscheidungen	   von	   Regierungen	   darstellen.	   In	   diesen	   Befragungen	   bewerten	   Eigentümern	   bzw.	  
Manager	  verschiedene	  Faktoren,	  die	  möglicherweise	  die	  Performance	  von	  Unternehmen	  beeinträch-­‐
tigen.	  Da	   Investitionsentscheidungen	  von	  Unternehmen	   zentral	   für	  makroökonomisches	  Wachstum	  
sind	  und	  möglicherweise	  von	  den	  Perzeptionen	  der	  Unternehmen	  beeinflusst	  werden,	  sind	  perzepti-­‐
ons-­‐basierte	  Indikatoren	  potentiell	  eine	  wichtige	  Informationsquelle	  für	  tatsächliche	  Wachstumshin-­‐
dernisse.	  Mehrere	  Studien	  haben	  in	  jüngster	  Vergangenheit	  den	  Wert	  von	  Unternehmensperzeptio-­‐
nen	  für	  wirtschaftspolitische	  Reformen	  untersucht.	  
Das	  Ziel	  dieser	  Studie	  besteht	  darin	  zu	  bewerten,	  ob	  und	  wann	  subjektive	  Perzeptionen	  von	  Unter-­‐
nehmen	  helfen	  können,	  spezifische	  wachstumsfördernde	  fiskalpolitische	  Reformen	  zu	  identifizieren.	  
Mit	  Hilfe	  eines	  oft	  benutzten	   theoretischen	  Modells	   für	  die	  Analyse	  von	  Fiskalpolitik	  und	   langfristi-­‐
gem	  Wachstum	  zeigen	  wir,	  dass	  Unternehmensperzeptionen	  verzerrt	  sind.	  Diese	  Verzerrungen	  spie-­‐
len	   eine	   große	   Rolle	   bei	   der	   Bewertung	   einiger,	   aber	   nicht	   aller,	   fiskalpolitischer	   Reformoptionen.	  
Dies	   impliziert,	   dass	  es	  wichtig	   ist,	   Fälle,	   in	  denen	  Unternehmensperzeptionen	  eine	   verlässliche	   In-­‐
formationsquelle	  darstellen,	  von	  anderen	  Fällen	  zu	  unterscheiden.	  Der	  Kern	  unseres	  Arguments	  be-­‐
steht	  darin,	  dass	  Unternehmen	  vor	  allem	  die	  direkten	  Effekte	  bewerten,	  die	  aus	  der	  Beseitigung	  be-­‐
stimmter	   wachstumshemmender	   Faktoren	   entstehen,	   aber	   gleichzeitig	   auftretende	   Externalitäten	  
weitgehend	   ignorieren.	   Diese	   Modellannahme	   benutzen	   wir,	   um	   Unternehmensperzeptionen	   von	  
mit	   Fiskalpolitik	   in	   Verbindung	   stehenden	   Wachstumshemmnissen	   modelltheoretisch	   abzubilden.	  
Wir	  untersuchen	  Steuern,	  öffentliche	  Dienstleistungen	  und	  den	  öffentlichen	  Kapitalstock	  in	  unserem	  
Modell.	  	  
Diese	  Studie	  zeigt	  erstens,	  dass	  Unternehmen	  unabhängig	  von	  Modellparametern	  verzerrende	  Steu-­‐
ern	  als	  das	  größte	  Wachstumshindernis	   sehen.	  Öffentliche	  Dienstleistungen	  werden	  von	  Unterneh-­‐
men	  meist	   als	   größeres	  Wachstumshindernis	   gesehen	   als	  Wachstumshindernisse,	   die	  mit	   dem	   öf-­‐
fentlichen	  Kapitalstock	   zusammenhängen.	  Diese	  Reihenfolge	   in	  der	  Bewertung	  von	  Wachstumshin-­‐
dernissen	  ergibt	  sich	  auch,	  wenn	  die	  Höhe	  von	  Steuern	  und	  Ausgaben	  optimal,	  d.h.	  wachstumsma-­‐
ximierend,	  ist.	  Gleichzeitig	  zeigen	  wir	  jedoch,	  dass	  Unternehmen	  die	  relative	  Wichtigkeit	  von	  gleich-­‐
artigen	  Wachstumshindernissen	  (z.B.	  unterschiedliche	  Arten	  von	  öffentlichen	  Dienstleistungen)	  kor-­‐
rekt	  einschätzen	  können.	  Schließlich	  vergleichen	  wir	  die	  WBES-­‐Daten	  mit	  den	  Vorhersagen	  unseres	  
Modells.	  Wir	  zeigen,	  dass	  die	  beobachteten	  WBES-­‐Rankings	  mit	  unserem	  Modell	  konsistent	  sind.	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1 Introduction
It has long been understood within theories of economic growth and devel-
opment that changes to scal policy, including changes in the composition
of public spending, a¤ect aggregate outcomes such as the rate of economic
growth (Barro, 1990, Devarajan et al. 1996). Increasingly, cross-country
empirical evidence has been found to support these model predictions. For
instance, Adam and Bevan (2005), Lopéz and Miller (2007), and Hong and
Ahmed (2009) nd that greater productive expenditures, usually dened as
including spending on transport, communication, education, and health, have
signicant, positive growth e¤ects. The consistency of these ndings suggests
that these ndings are robust, but because they are generated using macro
data they are open to the criticisms that the exact transmission mechanisms
through which public spending are e¤ective are left unclear, and that they
are likely to mask variation in the e¤ects of scal policy on di¤erent rms
(Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008).
In this paper, using data for South African rms, we investigate di¤er-
ences in the e¤ects of changes in the mix of public spending on rm level
productivity. There are various channels through which education, health
and transport expenditure may a¤ect private sector productivity. In growth
models with public nance, public expenditure a¤ects growth mainly through
its e¤ects on the marginal product of factor inputs including labor and cap-
ital. For instance, private equipment such as machinery and vehicles can
be employed more productively when public infrastructure is in place, and
people with access to basic health care can work more productively; see for
instance Agénor (2008a,b) who summarizes relevant empirical evidence to
motivate an endogenous growth model with public nance that incorporates
public spending in these areas. As aggregate growth outcomes must ulti-
mately be the result of changes to productivity that occur at the rm level,
rm-level data can provide evidence for a specic channel through which ag-
gregate growth outcomes could occur. More importantly, because aggregate
policy changes are unlikely to be determined by the individual rm, our ap-
proach deals more convincingly with any simultaneity bias complementing
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those results of the macro literature.
To conduct the analysis we exploit the particular scal context in South
Africa, and in particular the institutional mismatch between revenue-raising
and spending powers at the provincial level. This has the advantage that it
allows us to control for the government budget constraint in our estimations,
an issue shown to have a strong e¤ect on results in macro growth regres-
sions (Kneller et al., 1999). All broad based taxes are identical across South
African provinces and borrowing at the sub-national level is limited. As a
result, the level of public spending is largely exogenous to the individual
province and dependent on grants from the central government. Discre-
tionary scal policy choices instead di¤er across provinces and time in South
Africa in terms of the chosen mix of expenditures. Our empirical specication
therefore focuses on the e¤ects of changes to the mix of public spending and
separates them from e¤ects of changes in the level of spending. The scal
data also include details on public spending beyond those usually available,
including various types of health, education and transport expenditures by
province. This allows us to both exclude components of these expenditures,
such as those on administration, where the productivity-enhancing e¤ects
for rms are less obvious, but also to broaden the analysis of scal policy
e¤ects on rm performance compared to previous studies that mostly focus
on changes in transport infrastructure.1 As an additional advantage, pub-
lic spending data from South Africa is of high quality compared to other
countries which we discuss in greater detail below.
That the e¤ects of taxation can be separated from those of expenditures
on South African rms in addition to the use of micro data does not in itself
indicate that the correlations we uncover are causal of course. An important
1See for instance Datta, 2012; Shirley and Winston, 2004; and Reinikka and Svensson,
2002. The papers that are closest to ours are Bekes and Murakozy (2005) and Gabe
(2003). The former uses data from Hungary and nds that public investment by the
central government has positive and signicant e¤ects on rm productivity, and that public
investment by municipalities has negative and signicant e¤ects. Two potential problems
with their estimation are that municipalities are rather small so that public investment
may entail signicant spillovers which they do not control for and that they do not take
into account the government budget constraint. Gabe (2003) uses expenditure and revenue
variables to explain rm growth (measured as the change of employment) in the U.S. and
does not nd large and/or signicant e¤ects of scal policy.
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consideration here must be whether scal expenditures are targeted at par-
ticular industries in particular provinces because they have lower or higher
productivity than elsewhere. Or it could occur that unobserved province-
specic factors, such as unobserved economic shocks, a¤ect the productivity
of rms within an province and, through the automatic stabilizer mecha-
nism, may generate a change to the mix of expenditures. To deal with the
omission of di¢ cult to observe economic shocks to provinces and industries
we include full set of province-year and industry-year dummies in all our
regressions. To control for time-invariant omitted province-industry specic
factors such as geography or climate that may determine the mix of expendi-
tures and a¤ect the productivity of rms we also include in all specications
a full set of province-industry dummies. This set of dummy variables rules
out province-time, industry-time and province-industry omitted variables as
possible explanations for our results. However, these factors do not con-
trol for economic shocks that are province-industry specic, or for national
policies that are aimed at industries in particular provinces. To control for
this possibility we also test the robustness of our ndings to the inclusion of
province-industry-time dummies.
In these regressions, to identify the productivity-enhancing e¤ects of pub-
lic spending we exploit di¤erences in these e¤ects between rms that are lo-
cated within the same industry and province which we show are driven by
their capital-labor ratios. That the capital-labor ratio is critical for the ef-
fects of public spending on productivity can be directly derived from the type
of transmission channels discussed above. For instance, labor-intensive rms
can be expected to be more susceptible for basic health spending, and spend-
ing on public transport. The reason is that these spending categories pri-
marily a¤ect labor productivity. To correct for any province-specic industry
e¤ects that may cause the average capital-labor ratio to vary systematically
across provinces and industries, where this may include the composition of
public expenditures, the capital-labor ratio of the rm is measured relative to
the mean in each individual industry, province and time period. This implies
that we are comparing across rms that operate within the same province
and industry but have chosen to use di¤erent combinations of capital and
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labor. If, as seems plausible, these di¤erences in the capital-labor ratio are
exogenous to any common province-industry economic shocks, then these
di¤erences can be exploited to identify the e¤ect of changes in the expen-
diture mix on rm performance. As another advantage of using the capital
intensity as a way to identify the e¤ects of public spending, we automatically
control for any independent e¤ects that capital and labor may have, given
that we estimate a production function with capital and labor as indepen-
dent variables. The presentation of this identication strategy is our rst
contribution.
Our second contribution is to apply this type of identication to our
data. Given the categories of public spending that we label as productive,
we anticipate that these e¤ects are stronger for rms that use labor relatively
more intensively, i.e., those with relatively low capital-labor ratios. The
disadvantage of our approach is that we cannot identify the overall magnitude
of the e¤ect of scal policy on rm performance as any direct e¤ects of scal
policy on productivity are captured by the province and industry dummies we
include. The question we answer is therefore narrower than the cross-country
correlations between scal policy and growth that motivate this study.
To preview our results, we nd that reallocating public resources towards
productive categories (dened as subcomponents of expenditures on educa-
tion, health, and transport) has a robust, positive and signicant e¤ect on
the productivity of rms with capital-labor ratios in the bottom quartile of
the distribution within their industry, province and year over the medium
run. For those rms that use capital-to-labor with a greater intensity, we
uncover less robust e¤ects. The e¤ects are always positive, but only occa-
sionally signicant. From this we conclude that there is evidence that those
rms that choose to use relatively more labor than capital compared to others
in their industry in that province and year benet most from a change in the
expenditure mix towards productive spending. These ndings are robust to a
number of well known biases that arise in the estimation of rm level produc-
tion functions and to the inclusion of omitted factors at the rm, industry,
province, or time period that may help to determine rm productivity. These
robustness checks include the use of the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator and rm
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xed e¤ects to address the endogeneity of factor inputs. These ndings are
also robust to a number of other potential concerns, for instance to the exact
denition of productive expenditure that we choose.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and de-
scriptive statistics. Section 3 develops the modelling framework. Section 4
discusses the results, and Section 5 presents several robustness checks of the
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 The System of Fiscal Decentralization in South
Africa
The features of scal decentralization in South Africa are central to our es-
timation strategy. Since the end of the Apartheid era, South Africa has
undergone wide-ranging scal reforms, and a system of transparent, con-
stitutionally compliant intergovernmental scal relations has been created.
Government now comprises three spheres: national, provincial and local. The
scal system departs from conventional prescripts of scal federalism how-
ever because there is a mismatch between expenditure and revenue powers
at each of these di¤erent levels of government (Ajam and Aron, 2007).
Public expenditure policy is decentralized in a range of important areas.
Provincial governments are largely responsible for spending on provincial
roads, education (except higher education), health services, public trans-
portation, social welfare services, housing and agriculture. For these func-
tions, the level of public spending by the national government is very low, and
the national government is mainly responsible for setting minimum norms
and standards and for monitoring the overall implementation by provincial
governments. It also collects data on provincial public spending (Momoniat,
2002). The expenditure that the national government undertakes can be
expected to leave rm productivity una¤ected over the medium run, or it -
nances public goods such as national roads or higher education and research.
In these cases, signicant country-wide spillovers imply that there is no or
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little variation between the provinces. By contrast, provincial governments
provide goods and services that are unlikely to entail signicant spillovers
across provinces.
At the same time, the revenue side of government in South Africa is
fairly centralized: provincial governments collect very little revenue, and the
income raised within the province typically amounts to less than 5% of the
provincial budget (Ajam and Aron, 2007). In the period that we consider,
provinces have neither imposed nor collected broad base taxes, and the rev-
enue collected came from various licences (notably motor vehicle licences),
sales of goods, services and capital assets and various small base taxes (e.g.
taxes on gambling and horse racing). In addition, while in principle, provin-
cial governments are allowed to borrow to nance capital expenditure, in
practice borrowing is quite limited. Provincial governments are therefore
highly dependent on transfers from the national government. They receive
conditional grants which they have to earmark for pre-specied purposes,
such as health, infrastructure, housing and social development, and they re-
ceive non-earmarked grants (which are referred to as equitable share grants)
(Ajam and Aron, 2007). The level of the latter that a given province receives
depends on range of social and economic indicators.
These features together with the high quality of public spending data
which we discuss below make South Africa an interesting testing ground to
empirically evaluate the productive e¤ects of public spending. First, the sys-
tem of scal decentralization implies that regional variation in the level of
spending on central sectors is observable. Monitoring at the national level
lowers di¤erences in terms of public spending e¢ ciency across provinces, and
data collection at the national level is likely to imply that public spend-
ing categories are nearly identical. Second, given the government budget
constraint, the e¤ects of public spending depend on the nancing mecha-
nisms and are therefore intertwined with those of taxation. In South Africa,
the fact that the national government levies most taxes which are identical
across provinces while provincial governments are in charge of expenditure
categories allows us to distinctly estimate the nete¤ects of public spend-
ing. This limits the degree of unobserved heterogeneity across provinces.
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The e¤ects of public spending we estimate will not contain the e¤ect of their
implicit nancing through possibly productivity distorting forms of taxation
of the type reported in Schwellnus and Arnold (2008). In the regressions any
productivity e¤ects from the tax system in South Africa will be captured by
province-time e¤ects.
In order to ensure that our results are relevant for policy, it is important
to take into account which expenditure policy parameters provincial gov-
ernments are able to set. Given that the level of total expenditure by the
provinces is almost completely determined by grants from the national gov-
ernments which are largely beyond the control of provincial governments, at
least over the short- to medium run, it is the composition of public spending
where the discretion and autonomy of provincial governments seems to be
much more important. Any e¤ect that the level of scal expenditures might
have on the productivity of rms will again be captured by the province-time
e¤ects also included in the regression.
2.2 Firm level Data
The information on rms that we use is from the World Banks Enterprise
Surveys. These data are rich in detail on rm characteristics, and are de-
signed to be representative of the population of rms. However, they contain,
at least in comparison to other rm level datasets, a relatively small number
of observations and a limited panel dimension. We use data from two rounds
of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys in South Africa in 2002 and 2006, pro-
viding a total possible sample of 1,113 observations for use in our regressions.
The use of questions within the survey that ask for information for earlier
years means that while most control variables are only available for 2002 and
2006, information on rm output and most inputs is in principle available
for four years (2000, 2001, 2002 and 2006). The panel is unbalanced with an
average number of years per rm of approximately 1.95. We recognize that
an implication of the limited time dimension of the data is that we are likely
to identify productive e¤ects from public spending that are relatively instan-
taneous and miss those that take longer to a¤ect rm decisions. Finally, we
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corrected the data for obvious keypunch errors, deleted observations with
negative inputs or outputs and one observation with idiosyncratically high
sales volatility.
The rms surveyed are located in four out of nine South African provinces
and include Gauteng, Western Cape, Kwazulu-Natal and Eastern Cape (in
descending order by the number of rms located in each province that are in-
cluded in the surveys). Within each province considered, the majority of the
rms are located in the biggest city (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and
Port Elizabeth). As most rms are located far away from other provinces,
it seems unlikely that they benet from spending from other provincial gov-
ernments thereby minimizing problems related to estimating the e¤ects of
public spending in the presence of benet spillovers.
At the rm level, we use total rm sales deated by a sector-specic
deator as a proxy of rm output, the net book value of equipment and
machines deated by an economy-wide deator as a proxy of private capital,
the number of employees, and the cost of materials and intermediate goods
which we likewise deate using an economy-wide deator. We further use
information from the Enterprise Surveys to construct dummy variables for
foreign rms, large rms, exporting rms and rms that experienced losses
due to crime.2 These represent other rm specic factors that might a¤ect
a rmsproductivity. Tables 1 and 2 contain details about the rm level
variables and descriptive statistics.
2.3 Public Spending Data
Given that the location of each rm is known, it is possible to merge our rm
level data with provincial spending data provided by the South African Trea-
sury. Our provincial dataset includes public spending that is disaggregated at
the sub-sectoral level. In principle, our dataset also includes control variables
that reect the quality of education and road infrastructure in each province,
but the e¤ects of those variables are all captured by province-time e¤ects.
2A reliable variable for the age of the rm is not available and cannot be included.
Since it would be time-invariant, our empirical specications with rm xed e¤ect capture
the e¤ects of rm age.
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Table 1: Firm variables and provincial variables
Variable Description Years
sales (y) total sales per rm (in logs) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006
capital (k) net book value of machinery, vehicles, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006
and equipment (in logs)
labor (l) total workers (in logs) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006
materials (m) total cost of raw materials and intermediate 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006
goods (in logs)
exporter dummy (1 if rm sells goods in other countries) 2002, 2006
crime dummy (1 if rm su¤ers losses due to theft, 2002, 2006
robbery, vandalism or arson)
foreign dummy (1 if foreign ownership > 10%) 2002, 2006
large dummy (1 if labor > 50) 2002, 2006
Table 2: Firm variables and provincial control variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
sales 11.825 2.273 4.038 19.531
capital 10.058 2.087 2.641 16.832
labor 4.025 1.626 0 9.928
materials 11.054 2.471 1.948 19.442
exporter 0.092 0.289 0 1
crime 0.463 0.499 0 1
foreign 0.507 0.5 0 1
large 0.671 0.47 0 1
The variable denitions can be found in Table 1.
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While public spending data may often only poorly reect public outputs in
terms of public services delivered and public capital accumulated, anecdotal
evidence suggests that public spending data from South Africa is relatively
reliable and reaches the beneciaries in most cases. Ajan and Aron (2007)
note for instance that the quality of scal data, budget planning and control
at all levels of government has been improved as part of the scal reforms. A
report commissioned by Delegation of the European Union in South Africa
also nds that the level of transparency in South Africas budget processes
is high (Quist et al., 2008). The Open Budget Survey ranks developing and
developed countries based on their budget transparency and accountability.
South Africa regularly ranks among the top ve countries suggesting that
abuse or ine¢ cient use of public resources would be much easier to spot and
is therefore more unlikely to occur.
Provinces spend, among other things, on education, health, road in-
frastructure and public transport. Following Kneller et al. (1999) and others
we label these as productive spending (we do not consider spending by the
national government which cannot be traced by geographical location and
which can be assumed to have signicant nation-wide spillovers given the
types of public goods and services it provides or by municipalities where
existing data are not su¢ cient). Our data also allow further disaggrega-
tion of these expenditure functions. Given that the time dimension of the
rm-level data limits our ability to consider long lags of productive e¤ects
of public spending, we use this to exclude subcategories of education, health
and public transport and capital expenditure that may be expected to a¤ect
rm productivity to a lesser extent or not at all over a period of around
two years. Following convention, we label the remaining / excluded public
spending categories as unproductive.3 Table 3 provides an overview of how
we categorize public spending. For instance, in the education and health sec-
tors, we exclude administration spending. The remaining expenditure may
plausibly a¤ect rm productivity over the medium run.
Obviously, some parts of productive expenditure can only be expected to
3It is important to note however that public spending which is classied as unproductive
is not necessarily wasteful and may enhance social welfare.
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a¤ect private sector productivity over the very long run, such as the con-
struction of a new bridge or tunnel which takes years to complete but which
may increase productivity of private vehicles by cutting travel time. Here,
we focus on productive e¤ects of public spending that are likely to mate-
rialize over a period of 1 to 2 years. Spending on public transport, tra¢ c
management and road maintenance are likely to deliver much more quickly
tangible benets. Spending on public health may also rapidly improve labor
productivity, if for instance it results in increased availability of drugs against
common diseases, or if public awareness to prevent accidents or certain types
of diseases increases. Even spending on education may have almost immedi-
ate e¤ects on productivity: for instance, as a result of education spending on
early childhood development, labor productivity of the parents may improve
fairly quickly. In addition, improved education of students shortly prior to
graduation or spending on short courses for adults may a¤ect labor produc-
tivity over the medium run. Nevertheless, we consider the robustness of the
our results to these choices in Section 6.
We express the amount of productive public spending as the share of total
public spending by province. Total public expenditure is the sum of produc-
tive and unproductive expenditure. Public spending data are available for
all four provinces for the scal years 2000/2001 through to 2005/2006. Given
that public spending may vary with business cycle uctuations and that any
e¤ects on productivity may become apparent only after some lags, we fol-
low to some extent the macroeconomic literature and take averages of public
spending over two scal years. Specically, we regress the rm information
for 2002 with the average of the scal data for 2000/2001 and 2001/2002, and
use the average of the 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 scal years for the 2006 rm
data. The implication of this is that where our rm data are additionally
available for 2000 and 2001 the public spending data are not. We trade this
loss of information against reducing possible co-movement of the business cy-
cle with productivity and government expenditure composition and against
considering longer lags in the e¤ects of public spending. Depending on the
specication, we still use the 2000 and 2001 rm data for our estimation.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics, and Figure 1 displays productive
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spending and its subcomponents as shares of total provincial expenditure by
province and year. Even with a relatively narrow denition of what consti-
tutes productive spending, as a share of total province level spending, it is
relatively high at 55 per cent. As the table makes clear, the variation in pub-
lic spending categories also comes primarily from variation between provinces
rather than within provinces across time. The standard deviation between
provinces is around 3 times that within provinces. Cross-time changes in the
expenditure mix is also evident though. The share of productive to unpro-
ductive spending increased in all provinces between 2002 and 2006 (where
the 2002 and 2006 values are in fact both averages over two scal years as
explained above) and the increases in Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were
particularly large. The table also shows that most productive expenditures
relate to those on education, which are around twice as large as those for
health and over 7 times those on transport and capital expenditure. Fig-
ure 1 implies that the shares of productive spending increased in all four
provinces over the period considered, but the relative increase varied and
ranges from around 17% in Western Cape to around 25% in Eastern Cape.
3 Modelling Framework
As is typical in the literature we assume that output, Yit, of rm i in year
t, is produced using private capital (Kit), labor (Lit), and materials (Mit).
Into this framework we incorporate as an additional variable a composite
public input that represents the level of public services and public capital and
that enhances rm productivity, Gtp, which varies across time and provinces,
where p denotes the province. As production technology, we use the type of
CES production function originally proposed by David and van de Klundert
(1965) which allows for the e¤ects of Gpt to be not Hicks-neutral:
Yit = A
h 
1KiG
	K
pt Kit

+
 
2LiG
	L
pt Lit

+ (3Mit)

i 1

(1)
Gpt can be written as
Gpt = TptptCpt (2)
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Table 3: Fiscal variables provided by the South African Treasury
Variable Description (all in logs)
total expenditure total provincial expenditure / GDP
 prod. health exp., productive education
productive expenditure expenditure, productive transport &
capital expenditure
productive education public ordinary school education, independent school subsidies,
expenditure further education and training, adult basic training,
early childhood development
prod. health expenditure district health services, provincial hospital services
prod. transport & capital exp. road infrastructure, public transport, tra¢ c management
mainly agriculture, social development, housing, sport,
recreation, arts and culture, administration,
education (only public special school education,
auxiliary and associated services)
unproductive expenditure health (emergency medical services, central hospital services,
health sciences and training, health care support services,
health facilities management)
transport and public investment (public works,
community-based programme)
Table 4: Productive public spending (not in logs)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
(as a share of total exp.) (overall) (between) (within)
prod. expenditure 0.552 0.070 0.068 .022
prod. education expenditure 0.339 0.032 0.032 .008
prod. health expenditure 0.174 0.024 0.023 .006
prod. transport and capital expenditure 0.047 0.010 0.009 .004
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Figure 1: Productive expenditure by province
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where Tpt denotes total public spending in a given province in year t, pt
denotes the share of total public spending on Gpt (i.e., that is devoted to
productive categories), and Cpt represents other province-specic factors that
relate to the e¢ ciency of public spending.
Including Gpt in the production function of rms reects for instance the
fact that private vehicles can be used more productively when the quality
of the road network increases, that the cost of using private vehicles due to
lower maintenance requirements falls and that labor productivity is a¤ected
by various public services, for instance by those that are health-related. This
is what we refer to as the productive e¤ects of public spending.4
4We also recognize that there may also be less direct mechanisms through which public
spending a¤ects rm productivity however. For instance, total factor productivity can be
seen to also depend on factors such as capacity utilization, inventory levels and supplier
relationships. Higher capacity utilization implies that the xed costs of capital per unit
produced fall, low inventory levels can be maintained when the continuous supply of inputs
is ensured which likewise reduces production cost, and access to a larger number of sup-
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Ki and Li - together with factor-specic parameters 	K and 	L among
other factors - determine the productive e¤ects of a given level of Gpt.5 We
thereby assume that some of the key parameters that determine the output
elasticity with respect to Gpt, Ki and Li, are rm-specic. A priori, there
is no reason to believe that these parameters are identical across all rms,
and indeed, there is a host of reasons of why this assumption is likely to
hold true. For example, the location of each rm determines access to public
services and thereby the impact of Gpt on rm productivity. We exploit this
assumption below to identify the productive e¤ects of public spending.
An important concern in the empirical estimation of the e¤ects of the
composition of public expenditures on rm productivity is the omission of
variables that are correlated with the expenditure mix and the error term
in the regression. This form of endogeneity bias might be caused by time-
varying changes to the preferences of regional governments towards private
enterprise. For example, regions could in principle adopt a strategy of open-
ness towards international trade and FDI in order to encourage growth and
investment and compensate the (perceived) negative e¤ects of this by voters
to the security of their employment by increased welfare payments (Rodrik,
1998). Alternatively, expenditures might be targeted at particular provinces
because there is some province specic factor, such as its geography, that
raises (or lowers) the productivity of all rms located there. In order to
control for this possibility we include in all regressions a full set of province-
year e¤ects (Dpt) and industry-year e¤ects (Djt) e¤ects. We further test the
robustness of our results to the possibility that regional governments might
target particular industries by including province-industry-year e¤ects.
The province-year e¤ects that we include in the regression are obviously
perfectly collinear with Gpt which is the variable of interest. To identify
the e¤ects of scal policy we instead exploit di¤erences in their e¤ect across
pliers may enable the rm to purchase inputs at lower prices. Public spending, especially
on public infrastructure, may improve rm productivity through positively a¤ecting these
determinants of TFP. Shirley and Winston (2004) develop a theoretical argument along
these lines.
5	K and 	L are strictly speaking not necessary to derive our results and could be
omitted for simplicity, but they serve to show that our results also hold in a more general
setting.
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rms. While di¤erences in neither Ki nor Li across rms are observable, we
use information on the capital-labor ratio of rms, which to again remove
the e¤ects of province or industry level factors we express as a ratio to the
annual province-industry mean. We anticipate that rms that are relatively
labor-intensive in their production technology compared to other rms in
their industry in that region in the same year are more likely to benet from
spending on health, education and public transport for example.
It is straightforward to show that the capital intensity relative to the
annual province mean, Kit
Lit
=Kpt
Lpt
, is not driven by Gpt itself but only by how
susceptible rms are to Gpt.6 Prot maximization implies that the ratio of
the marginal products of labor and capital equals the ratio of factor prices.
Dividing this equation by the same condition of a hypothetical rm producing
mean output, Ypt, using mean inputs in the same province and year yields
(@Yit=@Kit) = (@Yit=@Lit)
(@Ypt=@Kpt) = (@Ypt=@Lpt)
= z (3)
where z is a constant that is determined by di¤erences in relative factor prices
across rms in one province. If factor prices are identical across all rms,
z = 1. Rearranging (3) yields
Kit
Lit
=
Kpt
Lpt
=

Ki
Kp
 
1 

Li
Lp
 
1 
z
1
 1 (4)
which shows that the capital intensity relative to the annual province mean
is only determined by exogenous parameters, and notably by di¤erences of
Ki and Li between rms which, from (1), determine the di¤erences of the
productive e¤ects of Gpt across rms within one province and year.
In the econometric specication, we also take into account di¤erences
across industries, for instance in terms of the production technology. To esti-
mate the e¤ects of Gpt, we then simply group rms by their capital intensity
relative to the annual-province-industry mean, i.e., whether their relative
capital intensity is low, lower medium, higher medium or high based on the
quartiles of the distribution of the relative capital intensities across all rms
6For simplicity, we abstract from di¤erences across industries at this point which we
however take into acount in the empirical specication.
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in all provinces and years. We also approximate (1) using a Translog func-
tion:
yit = + 1kit + 2lit + 3mit + 4k
2
it + 5l
2
it + 6m
2
it + 7kitlit (5)
+8kitmit + 9litmit + 10 [low]pt + 11[lmed]pt
+12[hmed]pt + 14Dpt + 15Djt + 16Dpj + 17Cit
where the subscript j denotes the industry and where all variables are in logs
(which is denoted by variables in lower case) which is the equation which
we estimate and where low, lmed, hmed represent dummy variables for the
rms with relative capital intensities, Kit
Lit
=
Kpjt
Lpjt
; below the 25th, between the
25th and the 50th and between the 50th and 75th percentiles, respectively,
which we each interact with pt (the share of productive public spending in
total expenditure). We do not include an indicator of high k=l rms, such
that the e¤ects of the public expenditure mix on low and medium capital
intensity rms are measured relative to that group.7 Given that capital and
labor (in logs) are already included in various ways in the empirical speci-
cation, we do not include the capital intensity as an additional indicator in
the regressions. These interaction terms therefore capture whether changes
to the mix of public spending a¤ect the production technology depending on
their relative capital-labor ratios. This approach does not allow inferring the
magnitude and the sign of the overall productive e¤ects. However, it seems
highly unlikely that reallocating resources from unproductive to productive
expenditure categories has overall negative e¤ects on rm productivity, and
theory does not provide any plausible transmission channel for such a sce-
nario.
Note that we have also substituted for Gpt using (2) where Tpt and Cpt are
implicitly captured by province-time e¤ects (Dpt) that we include and cannot
therefore be separately interpreted. It follows that because the province-time
e¤ects include the e¤ects of total spending, we implicitly hold this constant
in the analysis. In this regard we follow a tradition established in the macro
7Using dummy variables for the interaction terms has the advantage that the coe¢ cients
are much easier to interpret, and as we show below, our results are robust to varying the
number of capital intensity categories we use.
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literature by Devarajan et al. (1996) in estimating the growth e¤ects of
changes in the public spending mix. The coe¢ cient on pt is still identied
because it is interacted with the rm level measures of the capital-labor ratio
and measures the e¤ects of an increase of the share of productive expenditure
o¤set by a decrease of other types of expenditure.
Djt and Dpj are industry-time and province-industry e¤ects. Together
with province-time e¤ects, Dpt, they control for a range of unobserved factors
that a¤ect productivity. Cit represent controls for di¤erences between rms
in their access to foreign technology, in foreign ownership, in export status
variables and size (dummy). To control for the social environment in which
rms operate we add to the regression an indicator of whether the rm has
been a victim of crime.
Given the lack of a counterpart in the empirical literature, we feel that it is
important to establish the robustness of our ndings to a number of di¤erent
methodologies. Our base regressions come from estimating (5) using data
for 2002 and 2006. In order to exploit the full four years of rm data and to
improve the identication of the parameter values on the private inputs in
the production function, our second methodology estimates (5) in two steps.
In the rst step we estimate (5) including only all private inputs as right-
hand side variables using all four years of available data. In this step, we
include a full set of rm xed e¤ects and province-year e¤ects for 2002 and
2006, to avoid any bias caused by omitting the remaining variables including
the scal variables in this regression.8 In the second step, we use OLS and
impose the coe¢ cients from this rst stage regression on the relevant private
input variables in (5) and include back in the rm and scal variables omitted
from the rst stage. This approach is of course equivalent to that used to
construct measures of productivity from the residuals of an econometrically
estimated production function.
Finally, concern over the possible endogeneity of investment, and there-
fore the capital stock, leads us to implement the estimator proposed by Levin-
8Given that the location of rms in 2000 and 2001 is unknown, we cannot include
province-year e¤ects for these. However, as a robustness check, we also ran regressions
with no province-year e¤ects and with province-year e¤ects for all years.
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sohn and Petrin (2003). Implementation of the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator
requires at least three years of data. As already noted, whereas our rm level
variables are available for up to four years, our measure of productive public
spending are available for only two years. To ensure that the coe¢ cients on
the private inputs are robustly identied we again proceed in two steps. In
the rst step we follow the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator as usually applied:
the rst step properly identies the coe¢ cient on investment controlling for
its possible endogeneity. The second step is then identical to the above and
includes the scal variables of interest.
4 Results
In Table 5 we report results for various specications including those from
one-step, two-step and the Levinsohn-Petrin estimators, and including vari-
ous combinations of industry, time, and province e¤ects. Regression 1 in Ta-
ble 5 refers to our baseline estimation and we use the remaining regressions
to test the robustness of these results. In regression 1 we include province-
time e¤ects to control for province-specic components of the business cycle
and other omitted province-specic variables that vary over time, including
total public expenditure as well as other policy variables not directly related
to scal policy. We also use province-industry e¤ects to control for time
invariant province-specic industry characteristics and industry-time e¤ects
to control for omitted industry-specic shocks. In all regressions, we use
province-industry clustered standard errors to control for intra-class correla-
tion. The number of provinces is too small to cluster at the provincial level
only; however to further control for intra-class correlation, we use the wild
cluster bootstrap indicator as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) which we
discuss further below.
Beginning with the control variables we nd that the production function
performs sensibly and the estimated elasticities (calculated at the means
of the other right-hand side variables) are within the expected range. The
elasticity with respect to physical capital and labor in regression 1 are 0.05
and 0.26 respectively and there are mildly increasing returns across all of the
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private inputs for the rms in our sample. Of the rm level variables (foreign
ownership, size, export status and crime) few have a signicant statistical
relationship with the output of the rm across Table 5. This may be a
consequence of the use of a Translog production function and the relatively
small number of observations compared to many of the micro level studies
that have examined the relationship between internationalization and rm
productivity.
Turning next to the scal variables in regression 1, the results for the
productive expenditure variable can be interpreted as the e¤ect on rm level
productivity from an increase in the share of productive expenditures com-
pensated by a pro-rata decrease in types of non-productive expenditure, leav-
ing total expenditures constant. Regression 1 suggests that this type of scal
policy change is associated with higher rm productivity for those rms with
a relatively low ratio of capital to labor (relative to the respective province-
industry-year mean). Our estimates imply that a 1 per cent change in the
expenditure mix towards productive expenditure is associated with a rise in
rm output of 0.22 per cent. According to this result, changes in government
expenditure have a stronger e¤ect on output than changes in private capital
for these rms.
To evaluate the magnitude of these e¤ects further, from Table 4 we calcu-
late that the average increase in the share of productive expenditure within
South African provinces over time (relative to the mean) was equal to 4
per cent (the mean is 0.552 and the within province standard deviation
0.022). Multiplying this number with the coe¢ cient estimate suggests that
the productivity-enhancing e¤ects of changes to the expenditure mix is equal
to 0.88 per cent for rms with a low capital-labor ratio. The magnitude of
these e¤ects is economically important. The average change in sales over
time measured by the within standard deviation divided by the mean of
rms with a low relative capital intensity is 3.94 per cent, such that scal
policy contributed an estimated 22 per cent of this change.
For rms with medium capital-labor ratios we nd evidence of positive,
statistically signicant e¤ect from the productive expenditure share on their
productivity. That the estimated elasticity of public spending on rm per-
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formance is strongest and signicant for rms in the bottom quartile of the
distribution for the relative capital-labor ratio may be a consequence of the
types of scal categories that we label as productive, such as education,
health and public transport. Data limitations on the panel element of our
dataset prevent us from exploring whether the e¤ects di¤er over the long run
across rm types, but in Table 7 below we discuss results where we broaden
and narrow the types of expenditures we consider as productive.
In regression 1 we identify the e¤ects of changes to the mix of public
expenditures by using di¤erences in their impact across rms after controlling
for all time-varying province and industry level factors that may a¤ect a rms
productivity along with time-invariant province-specic industry factors. In
regression 2 we control for the possibility that there are di¢ cult to observe
factors at the province-industry-time level that a¤ect rmsproductivity and
are correlated with the scal expenditure mix. Our results are left unchanged
from the inclusion of these province-industry-year dummies. We continue to
nd evidence that those rms that have a low ratio of capital to labor relative
to other rms in their industry in that province are positively a¤ected by
shifting the expenditure mix towards productive categories and away from
unproductive ones. We now also nd that the magnitude of this e¤ect is
roughly identical to regression 1. For rms with a medium relative capital
intensity, the magnitude of the e¤ect increases relative to regression 1 and
remains signicant. This is a persistent feature of the results we present; the
positive e¤ect of public spending on rms that use more labor relative to
capital is robust.
In specications 3 and 4 of Table 5, we consider the robustness of our
ndings to the two-step estimation strategy outlined above, where we use all
four years of rm level data to improve the identication of the parameters
on the private inputs in the production function. In the rst stage of speci-
cation 3, we include rm xed e¤ects and province-time e¤ects for 2002 and
2006. Again the results are robust to this point.9 In the two-stage estimation
results we continue to nd that the coe¢ cients on the scal variables are sta-
9The standard errors of the output elasticities with respect to the private inputs also
come from the rst stage.
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tistically signicant and that the estimated elasticities are largely unchanged.
Changing the mix of province-level expenditures towards productive spend-
ing categories and away from unproductive categories whilst holding the total
budget constant, is associated with increases in rm level output for rms
with a low capital intensity.
A similar outcome occurs when we use the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator in
the rst stage of our 2-step estimation strategy to correct for the endogene-
ity of the estimated coe¢ cients on private inputs (specication 4 in Table
5). When using the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator we nd that the estimated
coe¢ cients on productive expenditures for the low capital intensity groups
are now larger compared to the previous regressions in 5, but still signicant.
Finally, in regression 5 we use the wild cluster bootstrap estimator proposed
by Cameron et al. (2008) to further control for intra-class correlation at the
province and industry level. In this specication, we are technically only able
to include province-year e¤ects. The coe¢ cient on the share of productive
expenditure for rms with a low capital intensity remains signicant and
robust, although their magnitude decreases.
5 Robustness of the Results
In Table 6 we consider the robustness of our results to changes in the deni-
tion of productive expenditures as well as other rm-expenditure interactions.
Thus far we have used di¤erences in the relative factor intensity of capital and
labor in the rmsproduction function to identify the e¤ects of changes to
the public expenditure mix on their performance. It follows from the decision
to express these capital-labor ratios relative to the mean value in each indus-
try, province and year, along with the province-time and province-industry
dummies that we include, that our results cannot be explained by di¤erences
in the characteristics of particular industries, or because province-specic
di¤erences in relative input prices lead to di¤erent factor intensities across
provinces. Firms from the various industries and provinces are spread across
the di¤erent quartiles. Along similar lines our results cannot reect the deci-
sion by an entrepreneur to open a rm producing a particular type of product
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in a particular province because the expenditure mix in that province favors
a production technology of that type. Such e¤ects will instead be reected
in the mean value of the capital-labor ratio.
The possibility that other rm level variables might explain our results,
or may also be important, remains however. For example, if larger rms tend
to be on average more capital intensive than smaller rms then it might be
the relative size of rm, rather that capital-labor intensity, that is important.
Alternatively, it is now well established in the international economics liter-
ature that exporters and foreign owned rms are larger and more productive
than rms that are not internationalized in these ways and it is possible that
these are the relevant rm characteristics. In the regressions in Table 6 we
consider this possibility. In specication 1 in Table 6, we also include inter-
actions between export status and the share of productive expenditure. The
results show that the coe¢ cients remain robust and statistically signicant,
whereas the interaction term of the share of productive public spending in
total expenditure with export status is not signicant. In specications 2
and 3, we consider whether productive expenditure has di¤erent e¤ects on
large rms or rms that are (partially) foreign owned. (i.e., we interact the
share of productive expenditure with the respective dummies). According to
our results, this is not the case.
In the remaining regressions in Table 6 we use the amount of labor, rela-
tive to the province-industry mean, (regression 4) and the size of the capital
stock, measured relative to the province-industry mean, (regression 5) as the
relevant rm characteristics implying that the low, lmed. and hmed: dum-
mies refer to these variables relative to the annual province-industry mean.
In all cases, we again use province-time, industry-time and province-industry
e¤ects to control for other omitted determinants of productivity. We do not
nd that the share of productive expenditures matters for any of these types
of rm. Firms that are small, or medium sized, when measured by either the
amount of labor or capital they possess relative to the annual average rm
in their industry and province, are not signicantly a¤ected by the mix of
public expenditures. We conclude from this exercise that the relevant rm
characteristic is their use of physical capital relative to labor and that rms
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that have relatively low capital-labor ratios are positively a¤ected by the
types of productive public expenditures we examine.
In Table 7, we further test the robustness of our results. In specication 1
of Table 7, we add rm xed e¤ects. Even though we only have two years of
data, our results remain robust. So far, in our specications, total unproduc-
tive expenditure, i.e., expenditure within the health, education and transport
sectors and in other sectors, has implicitly been the omitted expenditure cate-
gory in the sense that we assumed that this type of expenditure compensated,
on a pro-rata basis, an increase of productive expenditure. Even though we
control for unobserved, time-variant province-specic e¤ects, there may still
be the concern that the share of productive expenditure in total expenditure
is a¤ected by economic shocks because included within the denominator are
transfers and similar expenditures that may exhibit some pro-cyclical behav-
ior. Specication 2 addresses this concern: instead of including productive
expenditure as a share of total expenditure, we now express productive ex-
penditure as a share of total expenditure on education, health and transport
sectors. Here, we assume that whilst the level of spending on health, edu-
cation or transport may respond to random shocks to the economy, within
those categories the spending decisions are made based on di¤erent policy
priorities. For example, the share of spending on emergency medical ser-
vices or administration is a policy decision una¤ected by the position in the
business cycle, even if total health expenditure is a¤ected. Specication (2)
suggests that our results remain robust and that reallocating resources from
unproductive areas in the education, health and transport sectors to produc-
tive areas positively and signicantly a¤ects rm productivity in the bottom
capital-labor ratio group, although the e¤ects in the medium group are not
signicant.
We then test whether our results are driven by the particular way in which
we group rms based on their relative capital intensity. In specication (3),
instead of using quartiles, we use quintiles of the distribution of the relative
capital intensities across all rms in all provinces and years and therefore
distinguish the e¤ects of public spending across ve groups of rms. In
specication (3), our results remain robust in the sense that the e¤ects of the
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share of productive public spending is largest and signicant in the bottom
group.10
In the remaining two specications of Table 7, we test whether our results
are driven by the particular way in which we dene productive expenditure.
Thus far we have used a particular denition and include sub-categories of
education, health and transport as well as capital expenditure that may be
expected to be productive over the short run. When we include all sub-
categories of health, education and transport as well as capital expenditure,
where this now includes expenditures on administration, in specication (4),
the coe¢ cient of the share of productive expenditure is again statistically sig-
nicant. That the coe¢ cient also increases suggests perhaps that our initial
assumptions was too severe and that these other sub-categories have impor-
tant productive e¤ects over the short to medium run. In specication (5),
we are more selective and only include few subcategories of education, health
and transport spending. We exclude all education spending on the grounds
that their productive e¤ects may be subject to longer lags and only include
early childhood development based on the notion that this increases labor
productivity of the parents. We exclude all health spending except for dis-
trict health services, which is likely to have more immediate e¤ects on labor
productivity compared to provincial health services which in part may be
targeted at those people who are severely sick and who are hence not part of
the labor force. Finally we include spending on public transportation spend-
ing but now exclude any transport management and transport infrastructure
spending. The coe¢ cient decreases in size, but remains positive and signi-
cant in this regression.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines whether changes in the composition of public spending
a¤ects rm productivity and whether these e¤ects depend on rm character-
istics. Since it is well known that estimating production functions gives rise to
10Our results also remain robust to using terciles of the distribution of the relative
capital intensities (not shown).
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various biases, we use a variety of estimators and econometric specications.
We show that in general the composition of public spending matters for rm
productivity, and that there is robust evidence that its e¤ects vary across
rms depending on their capital intensities relative to the annual province-
industry mean. Firms that are labor intensive in relative terms appear to
benet to a greater extent from the forms of productive spending that we
consider compared to more capital intensive rms. Our identication strat-
egy which we have derived from a standard production function framework
allows us to control for any omitted province-specic time and industry ef-
fects.
We leave several possible extensions for future work. The robustness
of the results could be further tested through the use of additional estima-
tors and empirical methods. Our identication strategy probably addresses
potential endogeneity more convincingly than most other papers that ana-
lyze the productive e¤ects of public spending, both at the macro and micro
level. Nevertheless, concerns may still remain. For instance, our identi-
cation strategy does not allow controlling for provincial di¤erences in the
relative productivity of low capital-labor ratio rms relative to high capital-
labor ratio rms which could a¤ect our results. One constraint of our data
is certainly the availability of rm information across fairly short time peri-
ods, but we argued that productive e¤ects arising over the medium run are
plausible, and as a robustness checks, we further narrow the subcomponents
of education, health and transport expenditure that we consider as having
productive e¤ects over the medium run. In addition, the type of data we use
in combination with our empirical specication implies that we are unable to
evaluate the aggregate e¤ects of changes in public spending composition on
rm productivity. However, from a theoretical point of view, it seems highly
unlikely that changes in the composition of public spending in favor of pro-
ductive categories lower overall private sector productivity. In this sense,
our nding that productive public spending positively a¤ects productivity of
rms with a relatively low capital intensity implies that the productivity of
these rms increases in absolute terms, and not only relative to rms with a
high capital intensity. There are other aspects of the dataset that could be
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exploited further. For instance, it would be possible to compare the e¤ects of
di¤erent components of productive public spending; to compare the e¤ects of
aggregate productive public spending when o¤set by di¤erent elements of the
government budget; and it would be possible to explore the role of additional
rm characteristics for the e¤ects of public spending.
In contrast to other studies that evaluate the productive e¤ects of public
expenditure empirically, we fully take into account the government budget
constraint and rm characteristics simultaneously. This feature allows us to
draw well founded policy conclusion. First, governments are able to boost
rm productivity by reallocating a greater share of public spending towards
productive expenditure categories. Given that productivity at the rm level
is likely to be fundamental for long-run, aggregate economic growth, this
is less expensive than raising overall public spending including productive
spending. This is of current relevance given the large budget decits due
to the recent economic crisis in many countries. Changing the composition
of public spending, rather than raising productive spending and leaving un-
productive spending unchanged which in turn increases the overall level of
public spending and may require issuing debt for example, would seem from
our evidence to be one feasible option of how scal policy can be used to in-
crease the medium- to long-run growth potential of the economy. Second, if
governments attempt to raise rm productivity via the reallocation of public
resources, it is however important that they take into account the charac-
teristics of rms. While this issue needs to be further explored in future
research, it seems reasonable that for instance, the e¤ects of public spending
and its components depend on the technology of rms that in turn drives
their capital intensities.
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Table 5: Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES sales sales sales sales sales
capital 0.0481*** 0.0420** 0.0322 0.0100 0.0585
(0.0180) (0.0202) (0.0623) (0)
labor 0.258*** 0.264*** 0.222*** 0.218*** 0.253
(0.0300) (0.0202) (0.0415) (0)
materials 0.719*** 0.719*** 0.743*** 0.760*** 0.714
(0.0191) (0.0338) (0.0239) (0)
foreign 0.0305 0.0264 0.0363 0.0614** 0.0509***
(0.0268) (0.0278) (0.0299) (0.0293)
large 0.0310 0.0356 0.0954*** 0.0980*** -0.00309
(0.0377) (0.0396) (0.0327) (0.0309)
exporter 0.0198 0.0197 0.0275 0.0168 0.0392
(0.0242) (0.0248) (0.0301) (0.0302)
crime -0.0200 -0.0151 -0.0263 -0.0277 -0.0270**
(0.0154) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0171)
prod. exp. low([Kit=Lit]=[Kjpt=Ljpt]) 0.221** 0.256** 0.256*** 0.359*** 0.149***
(0.0939) (0.109) (0.0787) (0.0774)
prod. exp. lmed.([Kit=Lit]=[Kjpt=Ljpt]) 0.125* 0.149* 0.123** 0.220*** 0.0939***
(0.0651) (0.0755) (0.0486) (0.0481)
prod. exp. hmed.([Kit=Lit]=[Kjpt=Ljpt]) 0.0745 0.0752 0.0447 0.106 0.0722
(0.0607) (0.0647) (0.0687) (0.0680)
Constant 3.040*** 2.840*** 4.346*** 2.802*** 2.859
(0.404) (0.409) (0.199) (0.0506)
Observations 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113
R2 0.975 0.975 0.970
Province-Year FE YES NO YES YES YES
Industry-Year FE YES NO YES YES NO
Province-Ind. FE YES NO YES YES NO
Prov.-Ind.-Year FE NO YES NO NO NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1)-(4): ind.-prov. clustered standard errors in parentheses
(1),(2): OLS estimation based on 2002 and 2006
(3),(4): 2-step estimation; 1st step based on 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2006
and includes private inputs, province-year dummies (for 2002 and 2006)
2nd step: based on 2002 and 2006 and coe¢ cients of private inputs imposed
1st step in (3): rm FE. 1st step in (4): LP estimation
(5): CGM Wildboot with clustering at prov. and ind. level
Unproductive spending omitted scal category.
Table 6: Robustness I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES sales sales sales sales sales
capital 0.0482*** 0.0477** 0.0484*** 0.0755*** 0.0576***
(0.0180) (0.0293) (0.0191) (0.0282) (0.0194)
labor 0.258*** 0.257*** 0.258*** 0.244*** 0.232***
(0.0301) (0.0190) (0.0300) (0.0198) (0.0195)
materials 0.719*** 0.719*** 0.719*** 0.720*** 0.718***
(0.0190) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0120) (0.0251)
foreign 0.0308 0.0306 0.0280 0.0295
(0.0269) (0.0267) (0.0276) (0.0270)
large 0.0311 0.0311 0.0277 0.0238
(0.0376) (0.0375) (0.0330) (0.0369)
exporter 0.0206 0.0203 0.0192 0.0202
(0.0241) (0.0244) (0.0241) (0.0248)
crime -0.0199 -0.0200 -0.0205 -0.0207 -0.0194
(0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0149)
prod. exp. low 0.220** 0.224** 0.220** -0.0845 0.198
(0.0939) (0.0944) (0.0935) (0.126) (0.138)
prod. exp. lmed. 0.124* 0.127* 0.124* 0.00714 0.141
(0.0652) (0.0662) (0.0649) (0.0791) (0.105)
prod. exp. hmed. 0.0742 0.0756 0.0739 0.0196 0.0531
(0.0606) (0.0605) (0.0606) (0.0576) (0.0698)
prod. exp. [exporter] -0.0253
(0.0325)
prod. exp. [large] -0.0589
(0.0665)
prod. exp. [foreign] -0.0389
(0.0388)
Constant 3.034*** 3.046*** 3.042*** 2.016*** 3.174***
(0.404) (0.402) (0.403) (0.446) (0.423)
Observations 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113
R2 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975
Province-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Province-Ind. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Prov.-Ind.-Year FE NO NO NO NO NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ind.-prov. clustered standard errors in parentheses
OLS estimates based on 2002 and 2006.
(1) share of prod. exp. interacted with export status
(2) share of prod. exp. interacted with size category
(3) share of prod. exp. interacted with foreign ownership
(4) relative labor use interacted with share of prod. exp.
(5) relative capital use interacted with share of prod. exp.
Unproductive spending omitted scal category.
Table 7: Robustness II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES sales sales sales sales sales
dlny/dlnk -0.00379 0.0510*** 0.0474** 0.0494 0.0484**
(0.0306) (0.0296) (0.0180) (0.0301) (0.0302)
dlny/dlnl 0.448*** 0.255*** 0.259*** 0.258 0.258***
(0.0876) (0.0190) (0.0303) (0.0192) (0.0185)
dlny/dlnr 0.697*** 0.719*** 0.719*** 0.719 0.719***
(0.0303) (0.0181) (0.0191) (0.0171) (0.0191)
foreign -0.0355 0.0306 0.0302 0.0300 0.0309
(0.102) (0.0268) (0.0273) (0.0268) (0.0269)
large -0.0354 0.0306 0.0313 0.0301 0.0290
(0.151) (0.0379) (0.0376) (0.0375) (0.0377)
exporter -0.0515 0.0197 0.0197 0.0199 0.0201
(0.0841) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0242)
crime 0.0223 -0.0205 -0.0201 -0.0195 -0.0203
(0.0412) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0154)
prod. exp. low([Kit=Lit]=[Kjpt=Ljpt]) 0.450*** 0.308* 0.227** 0.587*** 0.0541**
(0.105) (0.155) (0.0970) (0.219) (0.0244)
prod. exp. lmed.([Kit=Lit]=[Kjpt=Ljpt]) 0.303*** 0.175 0.130* 0.326** 0.0304*
(0.0788) (0.107) (0.0659) (0.159) (0.0166)
prod. exp. hmed.([Kit=Lit]=[Kjpt=Ljpt]) -0.0150 0.109 0.0789 0.179 0.0211
(0.128) (0.0991) (0.0544) (0.148) (0.0160)
prod. exp. hmed2.([Kit=Lit]=[Kjpt=Ljpt]) 0.0141
(0.0758)
Constant 4.440*** 3.021*** 3.041*** 3.048*** 3.062***
(0.950) (0.403) (0.403) (0.405) (0.402)
Observations 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113
R2 0.966 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975
Number of eec_panelid 981
Province-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Province-Ind. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES NO NO NO NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ind.-prov. clustered standard errors in parentheses
OLS estimates based on 2002 and 2006
(1) rm xed e¤ects
(2) prod. edu., health and transp. exp. as a ratio of all exp. in these categories
(3) relative capital intensity categories based on 20th percentiles intervals
(4) broad expenditure categories used
(5) narrow expenditure categories used
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